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Abstract
The semantic web is an open and distributed environment in
which it is hard to guarantee consistency of knowledge and
information. Under the standard two-valued semantics every-
thing is entailed if knowledge and information is inconsistent.
The semantics of the paraconsistent logic LP offers a solution.
However, if the available knowledge and information is con-
sistent, the set of conclusions entailed under the three-valued
semantics of the paraconsistent logic LP is smaller than the
set of conclusions entailed under the two-valued semantics.
Preferring conflict-minimal three-valued interpretations elim-
inates this difference.
Preferring conflict-minimal interpretations introduces non-
monotonicity. To handle the non-monotonicity, this paper
proposes an assumption-based argumentation system. As-
sumptions needed to close branches of a semantic tableaux
form the arguments. Stable extensions of the set of derived
arguments correspond to conflict minimal interpretations and
conclusions entailed by all conflict-minimal interpretations
are supported by arguments in all stable extensions.
Introduction
In the semantic web, the description logics SHOIN (D)
and SROIQ(D) are the standard for describing ontolo-
gies using the TBox, and information using the Abox.
Since the semantic web is an open and distributed environ-
ment, knowledge and information originating from different
sources need not be consistent. In case of inconsistencies,
no useful conclusion can be derived when using a standard
two-valued semantics. Everything is entailed because the
set of two-valued interpretations is empty. Resolving the
inconsistencies is often not an option in an open and dis-
tributed environment. Therefore, methods that allow us to
derive useful conclusions in the presence of inconsistencies
are preferred.
One possibility to draw useful conclusions from inconsis-
tent knowledge and information is by focussing on conclu-
sions supported by all maximally consistent subsets. This
approach was first proposed by Rescher (1964) and was
subsequence worked out further by others (Brewka 1989;
Roos 1988; Roos 1992). A simple implementation of this
approach focusses on conclusions entailed by the intersec-
tion of all maximally consistent subsets. Instead of fo-
cussing on the intersection of all maximally consistent sub-
sets, one may also consider a single consistent subset for
each conclusion (Poole 1988; Huang, van Harmelen, and ten
Teije 2005). For conclusions entailed by all (preferred) max-
imally consistent subsets of the knowledge and information,
a more sophisticated approach is needed. An argumenta-
tion system for this more general case has been described
by Roos (1992). Since these approaches need to identify
consistent subsets of knowledge and information, they are
non-monotonic.
A second possibility for handling inconsistent knowledge
and information is by replacing the standard two-valued se-
mantics by a three-valued semantics such as the semantics
of the paraconsistent logic LP (Priest 1989). An impor-
tant advantage of this paraconsistent logic over the maxi-
mally consistent subset approach is that the entailment rela-
tion is monotonic. A disadvantage is that consistent knowl-
edge and information entail less conclusions when using the
three-valued semantics than when using the two-valued se-
mantics. Conflict-minimal interpretations reduce the gap be-
tween the sets of conclusions entailed by the two semantics
(Priest 1989; Priest 1991). Priest (1991) calls resulting logic:
LPm. The conflict-minimal interpretations also makes LPm
non-monotonic (Priest 1991).
In this paper we present an argumentation system for
conclusions entailed by conflict-minimal interpretations of
the description logic ALC (Schmidt-Schauß and Smolka
1991) when using the semantics of the paraconsistent logic
LP. We focus on ALC instead of the more expressive log-
ics SHOIN (D) and SROIQ(D) to keep the explanation
simple. The described approach can also be applied to more
expressive description logics.
The proposed approach starts from a semantic tableaux
method for the paraconsistent logic LP described by Bloesch
(1993), which has been adapted to ALC. The semantic
tableaux is used for deriving the entailed conclusions when
using the LP-semantics. If a tableaux cannot be closed, the
desired conclusion may still hold in all conflict-minimal in-
terpretations. The open tableaux enables us to identify as-
sumptions about conflict-minimality. These assumptions are
used to construct an assumption-based argumentation sys-
tem, which supports conclusions entailed by all conflict min-
imal interpretations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First,
we describe ALC, a three-valued semantics for ALC based
on the semantics of the paraconsistent logic LP, and a corre-
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sponding semantic tableaux method. Second, we describe
how a semantic tableaux can be used to determine argu-
ments for conclusions supported by conflict-minimal inter-
pretations. Subsequently, we present the correctness and
completeness proof of the described approach. Next we de-
scribe some related work. The last section summarizes the
results and points out directions of future work.
Paraconsistent ALC
The language of ALC We first give the standard defini-
tions of the language of ALC. We start with defining the
set of concepts C given the atomic concepts C, the role re-
lations R, the operators for constructing new concepts ¬, u
and unionsq, and the quantifiers ∃ and ∀. Moreover, we introduce
to special concepts, > and ⊥, which denote everything and
nothing, respectively.
Definition 1 LetC be a set of atomic concepts and letR be
a set of atomic roles.
The set of concepts C is recursively defined as follows:
• C ⊆ C; i.e. atomic concepts are concepts.
• > ∈ C and ⊥ ∈ C.
• If C ∈ C and D ∈ C, then ¬C ∈ C, C u D ∈ C and
C unionsqD ∈ C.
• If C ∈ C and R ∈ R, then ∃R.C ∈ C and ∀R.C ∈ C.
• Nothing else belongs to C.
In the description logic ALC, we have two operators: v
and =, for describing a relation between two concepts:
Definition 2 If {C,D} ⊆ C, then we can formulate the fol-
lowing relations (terminological definitions):
• C v D; i.e., C is subsumed by D,
• C = D; i.e., C is equal to D.
A finite set T of terminological definitions is called a TBox.
In the description logic ALC, we also have an operator
“:”, for describing that an individual from the set of individ-
ual names N is an instance of a concept, and that a pair of
individuals is an instance of a role.
Definition 3 Let {a, b} ⊆ N be two individuals, let C ∈ C
be a concept and let R ∈ R be a role. Then assertions are
defined as:
• a : C
• (a, b) : R
A finite set A of assertions is called an ABox.
A knowledge base K = (T ,A) is a tuple consisting of
a TBox T and an ABox A. In this paper we will denote
elements of the TBox and ABox T ∪ A as propositions.
We define a three-valued semantics for ALC which is
based on the semantics of the paraconsistent logic LP . We
do not use the notation I = (∆, ·I) that is often used for the
semantics of description logics. Instead we will use a nota-
tion that is often used for predicate logic because it is more
convenient to describe projections and truth-values.
Definition 4 A three-valued interpretation I = 〈O, pi〉 is a
couple where O is a non-empty set of objects and pi is an
interpretation function such that:
• for each atomic concept C ∈ C, pi(C) = 〈P,N〉 where
P,N ⊆ O are the positive and negative instances of the
concept C, respectively, and where P ∪N = O,
• for each individual i ∈ N it holds that pi(i) ∈ O, and
• for each atomic role R ∈ R it holds that pi(R) ⊆ O ×O.
We will use the projections pi(C)+ = P and pi(C)− = N to
denote the positive and negative instances of a concept C,
respectively.
We do not consider inconsistencies in roles since we can-
not formulate inconsistent roles in ALC. In a more expres-
sive logic, such as SROIQ, roles may become inconsistent,
for instance because we can specify disjoint roles.
Using the three-valued interpretations I = 〈O, pi〉, we de-
fine the interpretations of concepts in C.
Definition 5 The interpretation of a concept C ∈ C is de-
fined by the extended interpretation function pi∗.
• pi∗(C) = pi(C) iff C ∈ C
• pi∗(>) = 〈O,X〉, where X ⊆ O
• pi∗(⊥) = 〈X,O〉, where X ⊆ O
• pi∗(¬C) = 〈pi∗(C)−, pi∗(C)+〉
• pi∗(C uD) = 〈pi∗(C)+ ∩ pi∗(D)+, pi∗(C)− ∪ pi∗(D)−〉
• pi∗(C unionsqD) = 〈pi∗(C)+ ∪ pi∗(D)+, pi∗(C)− ∩ pi∗(D)−〉
• pi∗(∃R.C) =
〈 {x ∈ O | ∃y ∈ O, (x, y) ∈ pi(R) and y ∈ pi(C)+},
{x ∈ O | ∀y ∈ O, (x, y) ∈ pi(R) implies y ∈ pi(C)−} 〉
• pi∗(∀R.C) =
〈 {x ∈ O | ∀y ∈ O, (x, y) ∈ pi(R) implies y ∈ pi(C)+},
{x ∈ O | ∃y ∈ O, (x, y) ∈ pi(R) and y ∈ pi(C)−} 〉
Note that we allow inconsistencies in the concepts > and
⊥. There may not exist a tree-valued interpretation for a
knowledge-base K = (T ,A) if we require that X = ∅.
Consider for instance: a : C, a : D and C uD v ⊥.
We also use the extended interpretation function pi∗ to de-
fine the truth values of the propositions: C v D, a : C
and (a, b) : R. The truth values of the three-valued seman-
tics are defined using sets of the “classical” truth values: t
and f . We use three sets in the LP-semantics: {t}, {f} and
{t, f}, which correspond to TRUE, FALSE and CONFLICT.
Definition 6 Let {a, b} ⊆ N be two individuals, let C ∈ C
be a concept and letR ∈ R be a role. Then an interpretation
I = 〈O, pi〉 of propositions is defined as:
• t ∈ pi∗(a : C) iff pi∗(a) ∈ pi∗(C)+
• f ∈ pi∗(a : C) iff pi∗(a) ∈ pi∗(C)−
• t ∈ pi∗(C v D) iff pi∗(C)+ ⊆ pi∗(D)+, and
pi∗(D)− ⊆ pi∗(C)−
• f ∈ pi∗(C v D) iff t 6∈ pi∗(C v D)
• t ∈ pi∗(C = D) iff pi∗(C)+ = pi∗(D)+ and
pi∗(D)− = pi∗(C)−
• f ∈ pi∗(C = D) iff t 6∈ pi∗(C = D)
• t ∈ pi∗((a, b) : R) iff (pi∗(a), pi∗(b)) ∈ pi(R)
• f ∈ pi∗((a, b) : R) iff (pi∗(a), pi∗(b)) 6∈ pi(R)
The interpretation of the subsumption relation given
above was proposed by Patel-Schneider (1989) for their
four-valued semantics. Patel-Schneider’s interpretation of
the subsumption relation does not correspond to the mate-
rial implication ∀x[C(x) → D(x)] in first-order logic. The
latter is equivalent to ∀x[¬C(x) ∨ D(x)] under the two-
valued semantics, which corresponds to: “for every o ∈ O,
o ∈ pi∗(C)− or o ∈ pi∗(D)+” under the three-valued seman-
tics. No conclusion can be drawn from a : C and C v D
under the three-valued semantics since there always exists
an interpretation such that pi(a : C) = {t, f}.
The entailment relation can be defined using the interpre-
tations of propositions.
Definition 7 Let I = 〈O, pi〉 be an interpretation, let ϕ be
a proposition, and let Σ be a set of propositions. The the
entailment relation is defined as:
• I |= ϕ iff t ∈ pi∗(ϕ)
• I |= Σ iff t ∈ pi∗(σ) for every σ ∈ Σ.
• Σ |= ϕ iff I |= Σ implies I |= ϕ for each interpretation I
Semantic tableaux We use a semantic tableaux method
that is based on the semantic tableaux method for LP de-
scribed by Bloesch (1993). This tableaux method will en-
able us to identify the assumptions underlying relevant con-
flict minimal interpretations.
Bloesch proposes to label every proposition in the
tableaux with either the labels T (at least true), F (at least
false), or their complements T and F, respectively. So, Tϕ
corresponds to t ∈ pi(ϕ), Tϕ corresponds to t 6∈ pi(ϕ), Fϕ
corresponds to f ∈ pi(ϕ), and Fϕ corresponds to f 6∈ pi(ϕ).
Although we do not need it in the semantic tableaux, we
also make use of Cϕ and Cϕ, which corresponds semanti-
cally with {t, f} = pi(ϕ) and {t, f} 6= pi(ϕ), respectively.
So, Cϕ is equivalent to: ‘Tϕ and Fϕ’, and Cϕ is equivalent
to: ‘Tϕ or Fϕ’.
To prove that Σ |= ϕ using Bloesch’s tableaux method
(Bloesch 1993), we have to show that a tableaux with root
Γ = {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ}∪Tϕ closes. The tableaux closes if every
branch has a node in which for some proposition α the node
contains: “Tα and Tα”, or “Fα and Fα”, or “Tα and Fα”.
Based on Bloesch’s semantic tableaux method for LP, the
following tableaux rules have been formulated. The sound-
ness and completeness of the set of rules are easy to prove.
T a : ¬C
F a : C
T a : ¬C
F a : C
F a : ¬C
T a : C
F a : ¬C
F a : C
T a : C uD
T a : C,T a : D
T a : C uD
T a : C | T a : D
F a : C uD
F a : C | F a : D
F a : C uD
F a : C,F a : D
T a : C unionsqD
T a : C | T a : D
T a : C unionsqD
T a : C,T a : D
F a : C unionsqD
F a : C,F a : D
F a : C unionsqD
F a : C | F a : D
T a : ∃r.C
T (a, x) : r,T x : C
T a : ∃r.C,T (a, b) : r
T b : C
F a : ∃r.C,T (a, b) : r
F b : C
F a : ∃r.C
T (a, x) : r,F x : C
T a : ∀r.C,T (a, b) : r
T b : C
T a : ∀r.C
T (a, x) : r,T x : C
F a : ∀r.C
T (a, b) : r,F b : C
F a : ∀r.C,T (a, b) : r
F b : C
The individual a in the following tableaux rules for the
subsumption relation must be an existing individual name,
while the individual x must be a new individual name.
T C v D
T a : C | T a : D
T C v D
F a : D | F a : C
T C v D
T x : C,T x : D | F x : D,F x : C
T C = D
T C v D,T D v C
T C = D
T C v D | T D v C
An important issue is guaranteeing that the constructed
semantic tableaux is always finite. The blocking method
described by (Buchheit, Donini, and Schaerf 1993; Baader,
Buchheit, and Hollander 1996) is used to guarantee the con-
struction of a finite tableaux. A rule that is blocked, may not
be not be used in the construction of the tableaux.
Definition 8 Let Γ be a node of the tableau, and let x and y
be two individual names. Moreover, let Γ(x) = {Lx : C |
Lx : C ∈ Γ}.
• x <r y if (x, y) : R ∈ Γ for some R ∈ R.
• y is blocked if there is an individual name x such that:
x <+r y and Γ(y) ⊆ Γ(x), or x <r y and x is blocked.
Conflict Minimal Interpretations A price that we pay for
changing to the three-valued LP-semantics in order to handle
inconsistencies is a reduction in the set of entailed conclu-
sions, even if the knowledge and information is consistent.
Example 1 The set of propositions Σ = {a : ¬C, a :
C unionsq D} does not entail a : D because there exists an in-
terpretation I = 〈O, pi〉 for Σ such that pi(a : C) = {t, f}
and pi(a : D) = {f}.
Priest (1989; 1991) points out that more useful conclusions
can be derived from the paraconsistent logic LP if we would
prefer conflict-minimal interpretations. The resulting logic
is LPm. Here we follow the same approach. First, we define
a conflict ordering on interpretations.
Definition 9 Let C be a set of atomic concepts, let N be
a set of individual names, and let I1 and I2 be two three-
valued interpretations.
The interpretation I1 contains less conflicts than the in-
terpretation I2, denoted by I1 <c I2, iff:
{a : C | a ∈ N, C ∈ C, pi1(a : C) = {t, f}} ⊂
{a : C | a ∈ N, C ∈ C, pi2(a : C) = {t, f}}
The following example gives an illustration of a conflict or-
dering for the set of propositions of Example 1.
Example 2 Let Σ = {a : ¬C, a : C unionsqD} be a set of propo-
sitions and let I1, I2, I3, I4 and I5 be five interpretations
such that:
• pi∗1(a : C) = {f}, pi∗1(a : D) = {t},
• pi∗2(a : C) = {f}, pi∗2(a : D) = {t, f}.
• pi∗3(a : C) = {t, f}, pi∗3(a : D) = {t},
• pi∗4(a : C) = {t, f}, pi∗4(a : D) = {f},
• pi∗5(a : C) = {t, f}, pi∗5(a : D) = {t, f}.
Then I1 <c I2, I1 <c I3, I1 <c I4, I1 <c I5, I2 <c I5,
I3 <c I5 and I4 <c I5.
Using the conflict ordering, we define the conflict mini-
mal interpretations.
Definition 10 Let I1 be a three-valued interpretation and
let Σ be a set of propositions.
I1 is a conflict minimal interpretation of Σ, denoted by
I1 |=<c Σ, iff I1 |= Σ and for no interpretation I2 such that
I2 <c I1, I2 |= Σ holds.
In Example 2, I1 is the only conflict-minimal interpretation.
The conflict-minimal entailment of a proposition by a set
of propositions can now be defined.
Definition 11 Let Σ = (T ∪A) be a set of propositions and
let ϕ be a proposition.
Σ entails conflict-minimally the proposition ϕ, denoted by
Σ |=<c ϕ, iff for every interpretation I , if I |=<c Σ, then
I |= ϕ.
The conflict-minimal interpretations in Example 2 entail the
conclusion a : D.
The subsumption relation The conflict-minimal interpre-
tations enables us to use an interpretation of the subsumption
relation based on the material implication.
• For every o ∈ O, o ∈ pi∗(C)− or o ∈ pi∗(D)+
This semantics of the subsumption relation resolves a prob-
lem with the semantics of Patel-Schneider (1989). Under
Patel-Schneider’s semantics, {a : C, a : ¬C,C v D} en-
tails a : D. This entailment is undesirable if information
about a : C is contradictory.
The tableaux rules of the new interpretation are:
T C v D
F a : C | T a : D
T C v D
T a : C,F a : D
Arguments for conclusions supported by
conflict minimal interpretations
The conflict-minimal interpretations of a knowledge base
entail more useful conclusions. Unfortunately, focusing
on conclusions supported by conflict-minimal interpreta-
tions makes the reasoning process non-monotonic. Adding
the assertion a : ¬D to the set of propositions in Exam-
ple 2 eliminates interpretations I1 and I3, which includes
the only conflict-minimal interpretation I1. The interpreta-
tions I2 and I4 are the new conflict-minimal interpretations.
Unlike the original conflict-minimal interpretation I1, the
new conflict-minimal interpretations I2 and I4 do not entail
a : D.
Deriving conclusions supported by the conflict-
minimal interpretations is problematic because of the
non-monotonicity. The modern way to deal with non-
monotonicity is by giving an argument supporting a
conclusion, and subsequently verifying whether there are
no counter-arguments (Dung 1995). Here we will follow
this argumentation-based approach.
We propose an approach for deriving arguments that uses
the semantic tableaux method for our paraconsistent logic
as a starting point. The approach is based on the observa-
tion that an interpretation satisfying the root of a semantic
tableaux will also satisfy one of the leafs. Now suppose
that the only leafs of a tableaux that are not closed; i.e., leaf
in which we do not have “Tα and Tα” or “Fα and Fα”
or “Tα and Fα”, are leafs in which “Tα and Fα” holds
for some proposition α. So, in every open branch of the
tableaux, Cα holds for some proposition α. If we can as-
sume that there are no conflicts w.r.t. each proposition α in
the conflict-minimal interpretations, then we can also close
the open branches. The set of assumptions Cα, equivalent
to “Tα or Fα”, that we need to close the open branches, will
be used as the argument for the conclusion supported by the
semantic tableaux.
An advantage of the proposed approach is that there is
no need to consider arguments if a conclusion already holds
without considering conflict-minimal interpretations.
A branch that can be closed assuming that the conflict-
minimal interpretations contain no conflicts with respect to
the proposition α; i.e., assuming Cα, will be called a weakly
closed branch. We will call a tableaux weakly closed if
some branches are weakly closed and all other branches are
closed. If we can (weakly) close a tableaux for Γ = {Tσ |
σ ∈ (T ∪ A)} ∪ Tϕ, we consider the set of assumptions
Cα needed to weakly close the tableaux, to be the argument
supporting Σ |=≤c ϕ. Example 3 gives an illustration.
Example 3 Let Σ = {a : ¬C, a : C unionsqD} be a set of propo-
sitions. To verify whether a : D holds, we may construct the
following tableaux:
T a : ¬C
T a : C unionsqD
T a : D
F a : C
T a : C
⊗[a:C]
T a : D
×
Only the left branch is weakly closed in this tableau. We
assume that the assertion a : C will not be assigned CON-
FLICT in any conflict-minimal interpretation. That is, we
assume that C a : C holds.
In the following definition of an argument, we consider
arguments for Tϕ and Fϕ.
Definition 12 Let Σ be set of propositions and let ϕ a
proposition. Moreover, let T be a (weakly) closed semantic
tableaux with root Γ = {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ}∪Lϕ and L ∈ {T,F}.
Finally, let {Cα1, . . . ,Cαk} be the set of assumptions on
which the closures of weakly closed branches are based.
Then A = ({Cα1, . . . ,Cαk},Lϕ) is an argument.
The next step is to verify whether the assumptions: Cαi
are valid. If one of the assumptions does not hold, we have
a counter-argument for our argument supporting Σ |=≤c ϕ.
To verify the correctness of an assumption, we add the as-
sumption to Σ. Since an assumption Cα is equivalent to:
“Tα or Fα”, we can consider Tα and Fα separately. Exam-
ple 4 gives an illustration for the assumption C a : C used
in Example 3.
Example 4 Let Σ = {a : ¬C, a : C unionsq D} be a set of
propositions. To verify whether the assumption C a : C
holds in every conflict minimal interpretation, we may con-
struct a tableaux assuming T a : C and a tableaux assuming
F a : C:
T a : ¬C
T a : C unionsqD
T a : C
F a : C
T a : C
×
T a : D
T a : ¬C
T a : C unionsqD
F a : C
F a : C
×
The right branch of the first tableaux cannot be closed.
Therefore, the assumption T a : C is valid, implying that
the assumption C a : C is also valid. Hence, there exists no
counter-argument.
Since the validity of assumptions must be verified with
respect to conflict-minimal interpretations, assumptions may
also be used in the counter-arguments. This implies that we
may have to verify whether there exists a counter-argument
for a counter-argument. Example 5 gives an illustration.
Example 5 Let Σ = {a : ¬C, a : C unionsq D, a : ¬D unionsq E, a :
¬E} be a set of propositions. To verify whether a : D holds,
we may construct the following tableaux:
T a : ¬C
T a : C unionsqD
T a : ¬D unionsq E
T a : ¬E
T a : D
T a : C
F a : C
⊗[a:C]
T a : D
×
This weakly closed tableaux implies the argument A0 =
({C a : C},T a : D). Next, we have to verify whether
there exists a counter-argument for A0. To verify the ex-
istence of a counter-argument, we construct two tableaux,
one for T a : C and one for F a : C. As we can see below,
both tableaux are (weakly)-closed, and therefore form the
counter-argument A1 = ({C a : D,C a : E},C a : C). We
say that the argument A1 attacks the argument A0 because
the former is a counter-argument of the latter.
T a : ¬C
T a : C unionsqD
T a : ¬D unionsq E
T a : ¬E
T a : C
T a : ¬D
T a : C
×
T a : D
F a : D
⊗[a:D]
T a : E
F a : E
⊗[a:E]
T a : ¬C
T a : C unionsqD
T a : ¬D unionsq E
T a : ¬E
F a : C
F a : C
×
The two tableaux forming the counter-argument A1 are
closed under the assumptions: C a : D and C a : E. So, A1
is a valid argument if there exists no valid counter-argument
for C a : D, and no counter-argument for C a : E.
Argument A1 is equivalent to two other arguments,
namely: A2 = ({C a : C,C a : E},C a : D) and
A3 = ({C a : C,C a : D},C a : E). A proof of the
equivalence will be given in the next section, Proposition 1.
The arguments A2 and A3 implied by A1 are both
counter-arguments of A1. Moreover, A1 is a counter-
argument of A2 and A3, and A2 and A3 are counter-
arguments of each other. No other counter-arguments can be
identified in this example. Figure 1 show all the arguments
and the attack relation, denoted by the arrows, between the
arguments.
0A 1A
2A
3A
Figure 1: The attack relations between the arguments of Ex-
ample 5.
We will now formally define the arguments and the attack
relations that we can derive from the constructed semantic
tableaux.
Definition 13 Let Σ be set of propositions and let
Cα =“Tα or Fα” be an assumption in the argument A.
Moreover, let T1 be a (weakly) closed semantic tableaux
with root Γ1 = {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} ∪ Tα and let T2 be a
(weakly) closed semantic tableaux with root Γ2 = {Tσ |
σ ∈ Σ} ∪ Fα. Finally, let {Cα1, . . . ,Cαk} be the set of
assumptions on which the weakly closed branches in the
tableaux T1 or the tableaux T2 are based.
ThenA′ = ({Cα1, . . . ,Cαk},Cα) is a counter-argument
of the argument A. We say that the argument A′ attacks the
argument A, denoted by: A′ −→ A.
The form of argumentation that we have here is called
assumption-based argumentation (ABA), which has been
developed since the end of the 1980’s (Bondarenko et al.
1997; Bondarenko, Toni, and Kowalski 1993; Dung, Kowal-
ski, and Toni 2009; Gaertner and Toni 2007; Roos 1988;
Roos 1992).
Example 5 shows that an argument can be counter-
argument of an argument and vice versa; e.g., arguments
A2 and A3. This raises the question which arguments are
valid. Argumentation theory and especially the argumenta-
tion framework (AF) introduced by Dung (1995) provides
an answer.
Arguments are viewed in an argumentation framework as
atoms over which an attack relation is defined. Figure 1
shows the arguments and the attack relations between the ar-
guments forming the argumentation framework of Example
5. The formal specification of an argumentation framework
is given by the next definition.
Definition 14 An argumentation framework is a couple
AF = (A ,−→) where A is a finite set of arguments and
−→⊆ A ×A is an attack relation over the arguments.
For convenience, we extend the attack relation −→ to sets
of arguments.
Definition 15 Let A ∈ A be an argument and letS ,P ⊆
A be two sets of arguments. We define:
• S −→ A iff for some B ∈ S , B −→ A.
• A −→ S iff for some B ∈ S , A −→ B.
• S −→P iff for some B ∈ S and C ∈P , B −→ C.
Dung (1995) describes different argumentation semantics
for an argumentation framework in terms of sets of accept-
able arguments. These semantics are based on the idea of
selecting a coherent subset E of the set of arguments A of
the argumentation framework AF = (A ,−→). Such a set
of arguments E is called an argument extension. The ar-
guments of an argument extension support propositions that
give a coherent description of what might hold in the world.
Clearly, a basic requirement of an argument extension is be-
ing conflict-free; i.e., no argument in an argument extension
attacks another argument in the argument extension. Besides
being conflict-free, an argument extension should defend it-
self against attacking arguments by attacking the attacker.
Definition 16 Let AF = (A ,−→) be an argumentation
framework and letS ⊆ A be a set of arguments.
• S is conflict-free iffS 6−→ S .
• S defends an argument A ∈ A iff for every argument
B ∈ A such that B −→ A,S −→ B.
Not every conflict-free set of arguments that defends it-
self, is considered to be an argument extension. Several ad-
ditional requirements have been formulated by Dung (1995),
resulting in three different semantics: the stable, the pre-
ferred and the grounded semantics.
Definition 17 Let AF = (A ,−→) be an argumentation
framework and let E ⊆ A .
• E is a stable extension iff E is conflict-free,and for every
argument A ∈ (A \ E ), E −→ A; i.e., E defends itself
against every possible attack by arguments in A \E .
• E is a preferred extension iff E is maximal (w.r.t. ⊆) set of
arguments that (1) is conflict-free,and (2) E defends every
argument A ∈ E .
• E is a grounded extension iff E is the minimal (w.r.t. ⊆)
set of arguments that (1) is conflict-free, (2) defends every
argument A ∈ E , and (3) contains all arguments in A it
defends.
We are interested in stable semantics. We will show in the
next section that stable extensions correspond to conflict-
minimal interpretations. More specifically, we will prove
that a conclusion supported by an argument in every stable
extension, is entailed by every conflict-minimal interpreta-
tion, and vice versa.
Is it possible that a conclusion is supported by a different
argument in every stable extension? The answer is Yes, as is
illustrated by Example 6. In this example we have two argu-
ments supporting the conclusion a : E, namely A0 and A1.
As can be seen in Figure 2, there are two stable extensions
of the argumentation framework. One extension contains
the argument A0 and the other contains the argument A1.
So, in every extension there is an argument supporting the
conclusion a : E. Hence, Σ |=≤c a : E.
Example 6 Let Σ = {a : ¬C, a : C unionsq D, a : ¬D, a :
CunionsqE, a : DunionsqE} be a set of propositions. The following two
tableaux imply the two arguments A0 = ({C a : C},T a :
E) and A1 = ({C a : D},T a : E), both supporting the
conclusion a : E:
T a : ¬C
T a : C unionsqD
T a : ¬D
T a : C unionsq E
T a : D unionsq E
T a : E
F a : C
T a : C
⊗[a:C]
T a : E
×
T a : ¬C
T a : C unionsqD
T a : ¬D
T a : C unionsq E
T a : D unionsq E
T a : E
F a : D
T a : D
⊗[a:D]
T a : E
×
The assumptionC a : C in argumentA0 makes it possible
to determine a counter-argument A2 = ({C a : D},C a :
C) using of the following two tableaux:
T a : ¬C
T a : C unionsqD
T a : ¬D
T a : C unionsq E
T a : D unionsq E
T a : C
F a : D
T a : C
×
T a : D
⊗[a:D]
T a : ¬C
T a : C unionsqD
T a : ¬D
T a : C unionsq E
T a : D unionsq E
F a : C
F a : C
×
According to Proposition 1, A2 implies the counter-
argument A3 = ({C a : C},C a : D) of A1 and A2. A2
is also a counter-argument of A3. Figure 2 shows the attack
relations between the arguments A0, A1, A2 and A3.
1A 3A
0A 2A
Figure 2: The attack relations between the arguments of Ex-
ample 6.
Example 7 gives an illustration of the semantic interpre-
tations of Example 6. The example shows two conflict-
minimal interpretations. These conflict-minimal interpreta-
tions correspond with the two stable extensions. Interpreta-
tion I1 entails a : E because I1 must entail a : C unionsq E and
I1 does not entail a : C, and interpretation I2 entails a : E
because I2 must entail a : D unionsq E and I2 does not entail
a : D.
Example 7 Let Σ = {a : ¬C, a : C unionsq D, a : ¬D, a :
C unionsq E, a : D unionsq E} be a set of propositions. There are two
conflict-minimal interpretations containing the following in-
terpretation functions:
• pi1(a : C) = {f}, pi1(a : D) = {t, f}, pi1(a : E) = {t}.
• pi2(a : C) = {t, f}, pi2(a : D) = {f}, pi2(a : E) = {t}.
In both interpretations a : E is entailed.
Correctness and completeness proofs
In this section we investigate whether the proposed ap-
proach is correct. That is whether a proposition supported
by an argument in every stable extension is entailed by ev-
ery conflict-minimal interpretation. Moreover, we investi-
gate whether the approach is complete. That is, whether a
proposition entailed by every conflict-minimal interpretation
is supported by an argument in every stable extension.
In the following theorem we will use the notion of “a
complete set of arguments relevant to ϕ”. This set of argu-
ments A consists of all argument A supporting ϕ, all possi-
ble counter-arguments, all possible counter arguments of the
counter-arguments, etc.
Definition 18 A complete set of arguments A relevant to ϕ
satisfies the following requirements:
• {A | A supports ϕ} ⊆ A .
• If A ∈ A and B is a counter-argument of A that we can
derive, then B ∈ A and (B,A) ∈ −→.
Theorem 1 (correctness and completeness) Let Σ be a set
of propositions and let ϕ be a proposition. Moreover,
let A be a complete set of arguments relevant to ϕ, let
−→⊆ A × A be the attack relation determined by A ,
and let (A ,−→) be the argumentation framework. Finally,
let E1, . . . ,Ek be all stable extensions of the argumentation
framework (A ,−→).
Σ entails the proposition ϕ using the conflict-minimal
three-valued semantics; i.e., Σ |=≤c ϕ, iff ϕ is supported
by an argument in every stable extension Ei of (A ,−→).
To prove Theorem 1, we need the following lemmas. In
these lemmas we will use the following notations: We will
use I |= Tα to denote that t ∈ I(α) ( I |= α ), and I |= Fα
to denote that f ∈ I(α). Moreover, we will use Σ |= Tα
and Σ |= Fα to denote that Tα and Fα, respectively, hold in
all three-valued interpretations of Σ.
The first lemma proves the correctness of the arguments
in A .
Lemma 1 (correctness of arguments) Let Σ be a set of
propositions and let ϕ be a proposition. Moreover, let L
be either the label T or F.
If a semantic tableaux with root Γ = {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} ∪
{Lϕ} is weakly closed, and if {Cα1, . . . ,Cαk} is the set of
weak closure assumptions implied by all the weakly closed
leafs of the tableaux, then
{Cα1, . . . ,Cαk} ∪ {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} |= Lϕ
Proof Suppose that {Cα1, . . . ,Cαk}∪{Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} 6|=
Lϕ. Then there must be an interpretation I satisfying
{Cα1, . . . ,Cαk} ∪ {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} but not Lϕ. So,
I |= {Cα1, . . . ,Cαk} ∪ {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} ∪ {Lϕ}. We
can create a tableaux for {Cα1, . . . ,Cαk} ∪ {Tσ | σ ∈
Σ} ∪ {Lϕ} by adding the assumptions {Cα1, . . . ,Cαk}
to every node in the original tableaux with root Γ. Let
Γ∗ = {Cα1, . . . ,Cαk} ∪ {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} ∪ {Lϕ} be the
root of the resulting tableaux. Since I |= Γ∗, there must
be a leaf Λ∗ of the new tableaux and I |= Λ∗. The cor-
responding leaf Λ in the original tableaux with root Γ is
either strongly or weakly closed.
– If Λ is strongly closed, then so is Λ∗ and we have a
contradiction.
– If Λ is weakly closed, then the weak closure implies
one of the assumptions Cαi because {Tαi,Fαi} ⊆ Λ.
Therefore, {Tαi,Fαi} ⊆ Λ∗. Since {Tαi,Fαi} im-
plies Cαi and since Cαi ∈ Λ∗, I 6|= Λ∗ The latter
contradicts with I |= Λ∗.
Hence, the lemma holds. 2
The above lemma implies that the assumptions of an argu-
mentA = ({Cα1, . . . ,Cαk},Lϕ) together with Σ entail the
conclusion of A.
The next lemma proves the completeness of the set of ar-
guments A .
Lemma 2 (completeness of arguments) Let Σ be a set of
propositions and let ϕ be a proposition. Moreover, let L be
either the label T or F.
If {Cα1, . . . ,Cαk} is a set of atomic assumptions with
αi = ai : Ci, ai ∈ N and Ci ∈ Ci, and if
{Cα1, . . . ,Cαk} ∪ {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} |= Lϕ
then there is a semantic tableaux with root Γ = {Tσ | σ ∈
Σ} ∪ {Lϕ}, and the tableaux is weakly closed.
Proof Let Γ = {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} ∪ {Lϕ} be the root of a
semantic tableaux.
Suppose that the tableaux is not weakly closed. Then
there is an open leaf Λ. We can create a tableaux for
{Cα1, . . . ,Cαk} ∪ {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} ∪ {Lϕ} by adding the
assumptions {Cα1, . . . ,Cαk} to every node in the origi-
nal tableaux with root Γ. Let Γ∗ = {Cα1, . . . ,Cαk} ∪
{Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} ∪ {Lϕ} be the root of the resulting
tableaux. Since {Cα1, . . . ,Cαk}∪{Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} |= Lϕ,
there exists no interpretation I such that I |= Γ∗. There-
fore, there exists no interpretation I such that I |= Λ∗.
Since we considered only atomic assumptions Cαi, we
cannot extend the tableaux by rewriting a proposition in
Λ∗. Therefore, Λ∗ must be strongly closed and for some
αi, {Tαi,Fαi} ⊆ Λ∗. This implies that {Tαi,Fαi} ⊆ Λ.
Hence, Λ is weakly closed under the assumption Cαi.
Contradiction.
Hence, the lemma holds. 2
The above lemma implies that we can find an argument
A = ({Cα1, . . . ,Cαk},Lϕ) for any set of assumption that,
together with Σ, entails a conclusion Lϕ.
The following lemma proves that for every conflict Cϕ
entailed by a conflict-minimal interpretation, we can find an
argument supporting Cϕ of which the assumptions are en-
tailed by the conflict-minimal interpretation.
Lemma 3 Let Σ be a set of propositions and let I = 〈O, pi〉
be a conflict-minimal interpretation of Σ. Moreover, let ϕ be
a proposition.
If I |= Cϕ holds, then there is an argument A =
({Cα1, . . . ,Cαk},Cϕ) supporting Cϕ and for every as-
sumption Cαi, I |= Cαi holds.
Proof Let I be a conflict-minimal interpretation of Σ.
Suppose that I |= Cϕ holds. We can construct a tableaux
for:
Γ = {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} ∪ {Cϕ} ∪
{C a : C | C ∈ C, pi(a : C) 6= {t, f}}
Suppose that this tableaux is not strongly closed. Then
there is an interpretation I ′ = 〈O, pi′〉 satisfying the
root Γ. Clearly, I ′ <c I because for every a : C with
C ∈ C, if pi(a : C) 6= {t, f}, then pi′(a : C) 6= {t, f}.
Since I is a conflict-minimal interpretation and since
I ′ 6|= Cϕ, we have a contradiction.
Hence, the tableaux is closed.
Since the tableaux with root Γ is closed, we can identify
all assertions in {C a : C | C ∈ C, pi(a : C) 6= {t, f}}
that are not used to close a leaf of the tableaux. These
assertions C a : C play no role in the construction of the
tableaux and can therefore be removed from every node of
the tableaux. The result is still a valid and closed semantic
tableaux with a new root Γ′. The assertions in {C a : C |
C ∈ C, pi(a : C) 6= {t, f}} ∩ Γ′ must all be used to
strongly close leafs of the tableaux Γ′, and also of Γ. A
leaf that is strongly closed because of C a : C can be
closed weakly under the assumption C a : C. So, we
may remove the remaining assertions C a : C from the
root Γ′. The result is still a valid semantic tableaux with
root Γ′′ = {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} ∪ {Cϕ}. This tableaux with
root Γ′′ is weakly closed, and by the construction of the
tableaux, I |= C a : C holds for every assumption C a :
C implied by a weak closure. Hence, we have constructed
an argument A = ({Cα1, . . . ,Cαk},Cϕ) supporting Cϕ
and for every assumption Cαi, I |= Cαi holds.
Hence, the lemma holds. 2
For the next lemma we need the following definition of a
set of assumptions that is allowed by an extension.
Definition 19 Let Ω be the set of all assumptions Cα in the
arguments A . For any extension E ⊆ A ,
Ω(E ) = {Cα ∈ Ω | no argument A ∈ E supports Cα}
is the set of assumptions allowed by the extension E .
The last lemma proves that for every conflict-minimal in-
terpretation there is a corresponding stable extension.
Lemma 4 Let Σ be a set of propositions and let ϕ be a
proposition. Moreover, let A be the complete set of argu-
ments relevant to ϕ, let −→⊆ A ×A be the attack relation
determined by A , and let (A ,−→) be the argumentation
framework.
For every conflict-minimal interpretation I of Σ, there is
a stable extension E of (A ,−→) such that I |= Ω(E ).
Proof Let I be a conflict-minimal interpretation and let
E = {({Cα1, . . . ,Cαk}, ϕ) ∈ A | I |= {Cα1, . . . ,Cαk}}
be the set of argumentsA = ({Cα1, . . . ,Cαk}, ϕ) of which
the assumptions are entailed by I .
Suppose E is not conflict-free. Then there is an argument
B ∈ E such that B −→ A with A ∈ E . So, B sup-
ports Cψ and Cψ is an assumption of A. Since I entails
the assumptions of A, I 6|= Cψ. Since I is a conflict-
minimal interpretation of Σ entailing the assumptions of
B, according to Lemma 1, I |= Cψ. Contradiction.
Hence, E is a conflict-free set of argument.
Suppose that there exists an argument A ∈ A such that
A 6∈ E . Then, for some assumption Cα of A, I 6|= Cα.
So, I |= Cα, and according to Lemma 3, there is an argu-
ment B ∈ E supporting Cα. Therefore, B −→ A.
Hence, E attacks every argument A ∈ A \E . Since E is
also conflict-free, E is a stable extension of (A ,−→).
Suppose that I 6|= Ω(E ). Then there is a Cα ∈ Ω(E ) and
I |= Cα. According to Lemma 3, there is an argument
A = ({Cα1, . . . ,Cαk},Cα) and I |= {Cα1, . . . ,Cαk}.
So, A ∈ E and therefore, Cα 6∈ Ω(E ). Contradiction.
Hence, I |= Ω(E ). 2
Using the results of the above lemmas, we can now prove
the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1
(⇒) Let Σ |=≤c ϕ.
Suppose that there is stable extension Ei that does not
contain an argument for ϕ. Then according to Lemma
2, {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} ∪ Ω(Ei) 6|= Tϕ. So, there exists an
interpretation I such that I |= {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} ∪ Ω(Ei)
but I 6|= Tϕ. There must also exists a conflict-minimal
interpretation I ′ of Σ and I ′ ≤c I . Since the assumptions
C a : C ∈ Ω(Ei) all state that there is no conflict concern-
ing the assertion a : C, I ′ |= Ω(Ei) must hold. So, I ′ is a
conflict-minimal interpretation of Σ and I ′ |= Ω(Ei) but
according to Lemma 2, I ′ 6|= Tϕ. This implies Σ 6|=≤c ϕ.
Contradiction.
Hence, every stable extension Ei contains an argument for
ϕ.
(⇐) Let ϕ be supported by an argument in every stable ex-
tension Ei.
Suppose that Σ 6|=≤c ϕ. Then there is a conflict-minimal
interpretation I of Σ and I 6|= ϕ. Since I is a conflict-
minimal interpretation of Σ, according to Lemma 4, there
is a stable extension Ei and I |= Ω(Ei). Since Ei con-
tains an argument A supporting ϕ, the assumptions of A
must be a subset of Ω(Ei), and therefore I satisfies these
assumptions. Then, according to Lemma 1, I |= ϕ. Con-
tradiction.
Hence, Σ |=≤c ϕ. 2
In Example 5 in the previous section, we saw that one
counter-argument implies multiple counter-arguments. The
following proposition formalizes this observation.
Proposition 1 Let A0 = ({Cα1, . . . ,Cαk},Cα0).
Then Ai = ({Cα0, . . . ,Cαi−1,Cαi+1, . . . ,Cαk},Cαi)
is an argument for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Proof The argument A0 is the result of two tableaux, one
for Tα0 and one for Fα0. Then, according to Lemma 1,
{Cα1, . . . ,Cαk} ∪ {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} |= Cα0
where Σ the set of available propositions. This implies that
{Cα0, . . . ,Cαi−1,Cαi+1,Cαk} ∪ {Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} |= Cαi
So, {Cα0, . . . ,Cαi−1,Cαi+1,Cαk}∪{Tσ | σ ∈ Σ} entails
both Tαi and Fαi. Then, according to Lemma 2,
Ai = ({Cα0, . . . ,Cαi−1,Cαi+1, . . . ,Cαk},Cαi)
is an argument for Cαi. 2
Related Works
Reasoning in the presences of inconsistent information has
been addressed using different approaches. Rescher (1964)
proposed to focus on maximal consistent subsets of an in-
consistent knowledge-base. This proposal was further de-
veloped by (Brewka 1989; Huang, van Harmelen, and ten
Teije 2005; Poole 1988; Roos 1988; Roos 1992). Brewka
and Roos focus on preferred maximal consistent subsets of
the knowledge-base while Poole and Huang et al. consider
a single consistent subset of the knowledge-base support-
ing a conclusion. Roos (1992) defines a preferential seman-
tics (Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990; Makinson 1994;
Shoham 1987) entailing the conclusions that are entailed by
every preferred maximal consistent subsets, and provides an
assumption-based argumentation system capable of identi-
fying the entailed conclusions.
Paraconsistent logics form another approach to handle in-
consistent knowledge bases. Paraconsistent logics have a
long history starting with Aristotle. From the beginning of
the twentieth century, paraconsistent logics were developed
by Orlov (1929), Asenjo (1966), da Costa (1974), Belnap
(1977), Priest (1989) and others. For a survey of several
paraconsistent logics, see for instance (Middelburg 2011).
This paper uses the semantics of the paraconsistent logic
LP (Priest 1989; Priest 1991) as starting point. Belnap’s
four-values semantics (1977) differs from the LP semantics
in allowing the empty set of truth-values. Belnap’s seman-
tics was adapted to description logics by Patel-Schneider
(1989). Ma et al. (2006; 2007; 2008; 2009) extend Patel-
Schneider’s work to more expressive description logics, and
propose two new interpretations for the subsumption rela-
tion. Qiao and Roos (2011) propose another interpretation.
A proof theory based on the semantic tableaux method
was first introduced by Beth (1955). The semantic tableaux
methods have subsequently been developed for many log-
ics. For an overview of several semantic tableaux methods,
see (Ha¨hnle 2001). Bloesch (1993) developed a semantic
tableaux method for the paraconsistent logics LP and Bel-
nap’s 4-valued logic. This semantic tableaux method has
been used as a starting point in this paper.
Argumentation theory has its roots in logic and rhetoric.
It dates back to Greek philosophers such as Aristotle. Mod-
ern argumentation theory started with the work of Toulmin
(1958). In Artificial Intelligence, the use of argumentation
was promoted by authors such as Pollock (1987), Simari
and Loui (1992), and others. Dung (1995) introduced the
argumentation framework (AF) in which he abstracts from
the structure of the argument and the way the argument is
derived. In Dung’s argumentation framework, arguments
are represented by atoms over which an attack relation is
defined. The argumentation framework is used to define
an argumentation semantics in terms of sets of conflict-
free arguments that defend themselves against attacking ar-
guments. Dung defines three semantics for argumentation
frameworks: the grounded, the stable and the preferred se-
mantics. Other authors have proposed additional semantics
to overcome some limitations of these three semantics. For
an overview, see (Bench-Capon and Dunne 2007).
This paper uses a special type argumentation sys-
tem called assumption-based argumentation (ABA).
Assumption-based argumentation has been developed
since the end of the 1980’s (Bondarenko et al. 1997;
Bondarenko, Toni, and Kowalski 1993; Gaertner and
Toni 2007; Roos 1988; Roos 1992). Dung et al. (2009)
formalized assumption-based argumentation in terms of an
argumentation framework.
Conclusions
This paper presented a three-valued semantics for ALC,
which is based on semantics of the paraconsistent logic
LP. An assumption-based argumentation system for identi-
fying conclusions supported by conflict-minimal interpreta-
tions was subsequently described. The assumption-based
arguments are derived from open branches of a semantic
tableaux. The assumptions close open branches by assuming
that some proposition will not be assigned the truth-value
CONFLICT. No assumptions are needed if conclusions hold
is all three-valued interpretations. The described approach
has also been implemented.
In future work we intend to extend the approach to the de-
scription logic SROIQ. Moreover, we wish to investigate
the computational efficiency of our approach in handling in-
consistencies.
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